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Market entry and exit of skilled nursing
providers is analyzed to observe initial
industry responses to Medicare prospective
payment. Supply adjustments were immedi-
ate, and were stronger in urban than in
rural areas.  After12 years of steady growth,
widespread market expansion ceased in
1998, but net reductions in the number of
facilities occurred primarily in the hospital-
based sector.  In county-level modeling with
controls for State policy ef fects, post-
prospective payment system (PPS) reduc-
tions in the number of skilled nursing facil-
ities (SNFs) were associated with supply
considerations; reductions were more likely
to occur in areas with higher bed-to-popula-
tion ratios prior to PPS implementation,
and in areas that had recently seen expan-
sion in capacity.  County-level reduction in
the number of SNFs was not associated
with low income or other sociodemographic
risk factors.
OBJECTIVES
In 1998 the Medicare Program began a 3-
year transition in its form of payment for
nursing home care, from a cost-based
method to a system of prospectively set
prices per severity-weighted day of care
known as the SNF PPS.  Following a decade
of extraordinary growth in Medicare pay-
ments for skilled nursing and other post-
acute care, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA)
of 1997 mandated this transition as a strate-
gy to encourage efficiency and discourage
unnecessary services.  The new rates had
already been under development for sever-
al years by the Health Care Financing
Administration, and the background and
methods for their computation have been
described in detail in the Federal Register
(1997; 1998). Rates were derived from infla-
tion-updated average allowable rural and
urban per diem costs in an earlier base
year, that had been standardized for region-
al input price differences using an area
wage index, and for case-mix differences
using a system of resource utilization
groups (RUGs). During the 3-year transi-
tion facilities were paid based on a blend
that incorporated decreasing proportions
of their own historical cost per day; pay-
ments were not based on 100 percent of the
Federal rate until 2001. 
At the start of the PPS transition period
there was widespread industry concern
about the adequacy of the new system, and
its impact both on facility profitability and
on the quality of skilled nursing care.
Nursing facilities that delivered substantial
amounts of care to Medicare beneficiaries
faced rapid changes in financing that were
likely to affect their short-term profitabili-
ty, as they made necessary clinical and
managerial adjustments in response to the
incentives posed by PPS.  A few high-pro-
file bankruptcies of major shareholder-
owned nursing home chains drew public
attention to the new payment system,
prompting reviews from congressional and
other Federal agencies (Office of the
Inspector General, 1999; U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1999a, b, c; Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, 1999).
The U.S. General Accounting Office testified
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before Congress that the 1999 bankruptcy
filings by major chains were the result of
overinvestment in ancillary service deliv-
ery settings.  In their opinion, the filings
were indicative of a period of industry
adjustment to PPS, but did not pose a
threat to beneficiaries’ access to care and
did not constitute evidence that the rates
were fundamentally inadequate (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 2000).  Provisions
included in the BBA 1999 and again in the
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act
of 2000 modified several components to
the new system, and provided some pay-
ment relief by temporarily raising rates for
certain complex admission types.  These
legislative reforms, together with other
rate changes implemented by CMS as part
of its annual update process, addressed
some of the industry’s concerns about the
fairness and adequacy of the system.  The
essential structure of a fixed, all-inclusive
payment per case-mix adjusted day, howev-
er, remains unchanged.  
This study’s objective is to investigate
the impact of SNF PPS on market expan-
sion, and to identify differences in market
responses to the new payment system by
type of ownership, hospital affiliation and
location.  The nursing home industry is
characterized by considerable entry as
well as exit activity, and in gauging the
impact of SNF PPS it is important to take a
longer-range perspective by looking at pat-
terns of market growth over several years.
This article takes advantage of the histori-
cal information maintained in the certifica-
tion files, by tracking openings and clos-
ings of SNFs for the 12 years before imple-
mentation (1985-1997) and the 3 years of
PPS transition (1998-2000).  Market entry
and exit is only one of many possible mark-
ers for changes in long-term care (LTC)
supply.  Although this study examines only
the number of operating facilities, changes
in bed capacity, changes in the levels or
intensity of treatment, and changes in facil-
ity ownership or consolidation are all
potential indicators of changes in benefi-
ciary access to extended care.  Each of
these should also be studied, as the nation-
al data become available on service use,
cost, and profitability of Medicare SNF ser-
vices during the PPS transition period.
SOURCES
Data are taken from the Online Survey
and Certification (OSCAR) File, which is a
CMS public use file that is updated regu-
larly from State survey and licensure infor-
mation on all nursing homes that accept
Medicaid or Medicare patients.  Our
source file includes updates provided as
late as March 2001.  Within this file, infor-
mation on bed capacity, staffing levels, and
characteristics of the patient population
may be updated at different times for dif-
ferent facilities, such that the accuracy of
these data, as of a given file creation date,
depends on the timing of the State surveys.
The information extracted for our study,
however, relates primarily to new or termi-
nated provider numbers.  These items are
maintained by CMS as part of its provider
participation and billing records, and may
be considered current as of the release
date of any given file. 
For this study, new facilities are identi-
fied by new provider numbers and closed
facilities are identified by provider number
termination codes.  We have aggregated
the openings and closings and status
changes of all nursing homes in the
OSCAR file, by year, from 1985-2000.  Data
on the subgroup of Medicare-participating
facilities are further examined by location,
ownership, and facility type. 
County-level files were constructed from
the OSCAR data, which were then merged
with sociodemographic information from
the Area Resource File, as released in
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2001.  Summary variables were computed
to capture changes in the number of SNFs
by county, for the 3-year periods 1995-1997
and 1998-2000.  These were used in multi-
variate models identifying local conditions
that are associated with a post-PPS reduc-
tion in skilled nursing home supply.
Our data are organized by calendar year.
The new Medicare payment system began
in 1998 for facilities with fiscal years start-
ing on or after July 1, 1998, and therefore,
was effective for at most one-half of that
year.  For some analyses we needed to
dichotomize the data into pre- and post-PPS
periods, and this required a decision on
whether to identify 1998 or 1999 as the first
PPS year.  We chose to treat 1998 as the
first year of PPS, because the industry had
knowledge of the BBA requirements and
new rates by the beginning of that period.
INDUSTRY BACKGROUND
At the start of 2001 there were approxi-
mately 17,000 nursing homes in the United
States that were certified to provide care to
Medicaid and/or Medicare beneficiaries,
and these operated 1.7 million extended
care beds.  Nearly two-thirds of nursing
homes are proprietary, owned by corpora-
tions or — less commonly — by individuals
or partnerships.  Another 27 percent are
organized as private non-profit entities and
the remainder are public.  Twelve percent
of all nursing facilities are operated as sub-
units within hospitals; the rest are licensed
as freestanding facilities.  The number of
beds operated by a single facility ranges
from 4 to nearly 1,400, but the median size
of freestanding facilities at the beginning of
2001 was 100 beds, and the median for hos-
pital-based facilities was only 30 beds.  For-
profit facilities tend to be larger than not-
for-profit ones, but this is because 97 per-
cent of all proprietary nursing homes are
licensed as freestanding. 
Most admissions to nursing homes are
not covered by Medicare. The Medicare
skilled nursing service benefit is designed
as a supplement to inpatient acute hospital
services (Health Care Financing Admini-
stration, 1992; Office of the Inspector
General, 1994).  Medicare covers extended
care for skilled nursing and rehabilitative
services if they are provided in a certified
facility or hospital swing bed, and only sub-
sequent to an acute care admission.
Coverage extends for up to 100 days, but
beneficiaries pay substantial copayments
after the 20th day.  Medicare-sponsored
patients typically account for less than 9
percent of all nursing home patients, and
only 12 percent of total nursing home
expenditures (American Health Care Asso-
ciation, 2001).  Though small, Medicare’s
share has grown rapidly over the last two
decades;  according to the National Health
Expenditures Survey, Medicare accounted
for only 2 percent of expenditures in 1979
and 5 percent in 1989 (Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2001), and
the growth can be attributed both to an
increasing use rate per beneficiary, and
more intensive and rehabilitation-oriented
services.
The majority of nursing home patients
are receiving chronic or custodial care, for
which Medicaid is the main payer.  Twelve
percent of all nursing homes in the OSCAR
File are certified for Medicaid and privately
covered patients, but do not participate in
the Medicare Program at all. These non-
participating homes are referred to as
nursing facilities.  The care provided in
these settings is generally longer in dura-
tion and less intense, and is not required to
be carried out or directly supervised by
licensed nursing and/or rehabilitation ther-
apy personnel.  Consistent with other liter-
ature in this field, we refer to nursing homes
that are certified to provide at least some
skilled level care as Medicare-participating
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nursing homes or SNFs.  It is important to
keep in mind that a SNF may certify only
part of its bed capacity for Medicare
patients, and skilled-level services can
account for widely varying proportions of
the total patient care provided in nursing
homes that are identified as SNFs.
Furthermore, a bed that is certified for
skilled care is not necessarily staffed to
accommodate that level of care, unless a
skilled-level patient is actually in that bed.
A Medicare-certified bed may be used for




The total number of certified nursing
homes in the United States increased by
only 15 percent over the 12 years from
1985 to 1997 (Figure 1).  In this same peri-
od, the number of certified for skilled care
grew by 136 percent, from 6,300 to nearly
14,900.  SNF expansion occurred in both
the for-profit and non-profit sectors.  Until
1997, hospital-based facilities increased at a
faster rate than freestanding ones, nearly
tripling in number over these 12 years and
increasing proportionally from 10 to 15
percent of total Medicare-participating
facilities.  Because not every bed in a new
or converted SNF is required to be certi-
fied for skilled-level care, the increase in
related Medicare-certified bed capacity
may not have been as dramatic as the
increase in Medicare-certified facilities,
but it will still have been substantial. 
The growth in SNFs was accompanied
by reduction in the number of  nursing
facility-only facilities, and a large portion of
the increase in SNFs was the result of sta-
tus changes by existing facilities that
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NOTE: SNF is skilled nursing facility.
SOURCE: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Data Analysis from the Online Survey and Certification
Reporting System File, 2001.
Figure 1
Number of Total Certified Nursing Homes, United States: 1985-2000
began to provide at least some skilled-level
care to Medicare beneficiaries.  Out of
more than 7,000 terminations recorded for
nursing facility provider numbers in the
decade before PPS (1987-1997), nearly 8 in
10— or about 500 per year—were coded in
the OSCAR File as status changes rather
than closures.  If these had all been
changes from non-Medicare to Medicare-
participating status, nursing facility conver-
sions would have accounted for 54 percent
of the new SNF provider numbers assigned
during this period.  Status changes among
existing SNFs are less common, averaging
only 26 per year in this same period.
Immediately following PPS implementa-
tion there was some increase in this num-
ber (58 in 1998 and 62 in 1999), but they
dropped back to earlier levels in 2000.
While there may have been some fear that
nursing homes would opt out of the
Medicare Program after the implementa-
tion of PPS by abandoning skilled-level
care and seeking recertification as nursing
facility, there is no evidence of this during
the PPS phase-in period.
Medicare-Certified Market 
The remainder of this article follows
activity among SNFs only, as indicative of
entry and exit behavior in the market for
Medicare-sponsored LTC.  We track all ter-
minated SNF provider numbers as facility
closures, even though a small number of
them represent status changes that may be
closures only to beneficiaries of Medicare-
covered services.
The rapid and widespread expansion of
Medicare-certified facilities stopped after
1997.  The number of certified freestand-
ing SNFs increased very slightly from 1998
to 2000, and the number of hospital-based
units actually declined.  Figure 2 shows the
number of SNFs opening and closing in
each year since 1985.  In the decade lead-
ing up to BBA, newly opened facilities out-
numbered closed ones nearly seven to one,
in both the for-profit and not-for-profit sec-
tors.  Beginning in 1998, entry activity
declined, but did not stop altogether, while
the annual number of closing facilities
grew substantially.  Even in these years,
however, total market entries and exits
were nearly balanced.  Because the new
entrants were nearly all freestanding while
the closures tended to be in the smaller
hospital-based facilities, the net effect of
entry and exit on LTC beds over 1998-2000
is likely to have been an increase.
The nursing home industry appears to
be highly responsive to the Medicare regu-
latory environment, despite the fact that
Medicare-sponsored skilled care repre-
sents a minority of its business.  The spike
in the number of new facilities that can be
seen in Figure 2 in 1989 occurred immedi-
ately after two regulatory events that broad-
ened Medicare’s extended care benefit.
One was a set of clarifications issued by the
Health Care Financing Administration in
1987 that were intended to reduce regional
variation in the interpretation of the SNF
benefit and to encourage facilities to set
higher standards for functional recovery.
These were, at least in part, a response to
provisions in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 that focused on
the need to set standards for functional
recovery in skilled nursing settings (U.S.
General Accounting Office, 1997). The
other was a provision of the Medicare
Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of
1988, which was effective throughout 1989,
but was repealed in the subsequent year.
The MCCA eliminated what is known as
the 3-day rule, a Medicare requirement that
inpatient skilled nursing services be cov-
ered subsequent to an acute hospitalization
of at least 72 hours.  The change would
have extended coverage to many beneficia-
ries under a wider range of circumstances,
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and it resulted in an immediate though
short-lived spike in service utilization
(Health Care Financing Administration,
1992). The number of SNFs  continued to
grow even after the MCCA was repealed,
but the pace was slower.
The increase in SNFs occurred across dif-
ferent types and sizes of community, and
very similar cumulative trends can be seen if
the data are subdivided by metropolitan sta-
tus, or by level of rurality within non-metro-
politan counties. (The codes are based on a
combination of the Office of Management
and Budget’s metropolitan areas of 1993 and
the population size of a country’s largest city
or urbanized area as estimated for 1997
(Ghelfi and Parker, 1997).1 Although the
absolute number of new facilities is consis-
tently smaller in the non-metropolitan coun-
ties across the years, the trends over time
are similar across county types.  
There are differences between urban
and rural settings in the proportions and
types of facilities that opened and closed
during the post-PPS period (Figure 3).
The net decline in the number of urban
facilities between 1998 and 2000 is almost
entirely from reductions in hospital-based
units.  The number of hospital-based facili-
ties throughout the country declined by
342 — resulting in proportional reductions
of nearly 20 percent in urban and 9 percent
in rural settings, from their respective lev-
els at the end of 1997. 
After 1997, however, the entry and exit
patterns are more complex than they
appear from the graphs of cumulative
change.  Figures 4 and 5 show that virtual-
ly no new hospital-based facilities opened
























NOTE: SNFs is skilled nursing facilities.
SOURCE: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Data analysis from the Online Survey and Certification
Reporting System File, 2001.
Figure 2
Market Entry and Exit of Skilled Nursing Facilities, United States: 1985–2000
1 Data sorted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Urban
Influence Codes are not shown, but are available on request
from the author.
after 1997 in urban or in rural counties, and
so many existing units closed that by the
end of 2000, the total number of hospital-
based facilities had declined to the level
that had prevailed in 1994.  Among free-
standing units there was also a substantial
increase in the number of closures begin-
ning in 1998, but the key difference is that
the market still supported new entrants;
the number of new freestanding providers
still equaled or exceeded the number of
terminated ones in each of the post-PPS
years.  Overall, there was a net loss of facil-
ities in metropolitan areas, but a net gain in
non-metropolitan ones, during the three
PPS transition years.  
If we were to aggregate this activity by
ownership status, the analysis would show
not-for-profit facilities closing in greater
proportions than for-profit facilities. The
apparent differences by ownership are
attributable, however, to the fact that so
few for-profit facilities are hospital-based.
We found little difference between for-prof-
it and not-for-profit freestanding facilities in
their patterns of cumulative change, either
before or after the introduction of PPS.
County-Level Supply Changes
Our data on firm entry and exit does not
track the new providers identified in the
OSCAR File to determine if the physical
facility was operating previously under dif-
ferent ownership.  Some of the facility open-
ings and closings that have been identified,
therefore, will have been the result of
changes in ownership, but not an actual
gain or loss of a facility in the community.
To the extent that this activity represents
the effects of acquisition and consolidation,
the OSCAR data may overstate entry and






























NOTES: Lines are not stacked; y-axis measures the cumulative total since 1985, within each group. Urban and
rural defined from Urban Influence Codes, which are based on 1993 county metropolitan statistical area assignment.
SOURCES: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Data analysis from the Online Survey and Certification
Reporting System File, 2001; and (Ghelfi, L.M. and Parker, T.S., 1997).
Figure 3
Cumulative Increases to Nursing Facilities and Related Bed Complements, by Hospital Affiliation
and Location: United States, 1985-2000
exit behavior.  The net change in facilities is
an estimate of change in supply, but it may
still overstate any reductions if there have
been consolidations of smaller homes under
one owner.  Increasing ownership turnover
or consolidation following PPS implementa-
tion is an important measure of industry
response in its own right, one that should
be studied in combination with other certi-
fication and cost report utilization data as it
becomes available.  To get a better approx-
imation of real entry and exit patterns and
assess the local effects of net changes in
nursing home supply, we aggregated the
OSCAR data on new and terminated
providers at the individual county- level.
We computed the net change in nursing
homes, by county and year, and then aggre-
gated these numbers for the 3-year period
before PPS (1995-1997), and during the
transition (1998-2000).
U.S. counties vary widely in population
base and land area as well as in LTC supply.
At one extreme, the OSCAR File listed 425
certified nursing homes in Los Angeles
County alone.  Three-fourths of all metro-
politan counties, however, and all non-met-
ropolitan counties, had fewer than 15
homes. Seven percent of rural counties had
no nursing homes at all at the beginning of
2001, and 16 percent had no Medicare-par-
ticipating homes.  During the period of
expansion from 1985-1997, three-fourths of
all counties experienced some growth in
the number of facilities and less than 1 per-
cent showed a net reduction (Table 1).
Even in the last 3 years prior to PPS imple-
mentation (1995-1997), 36 percent of coun-
ties had a net increase and only 2 percent
had a net reduction. However,  summarized
OSCAR data show that for the majority of
counties in the United States, regardless of




























NOTES: Urban identified according to 1997 Urban Influence Codes (Ghelfi, L.M. and Parker, T.S., 1997).
SOURCE: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Data analysis from the Online Survey and Certification
Reporting System File, 2001.
Figure 4
Entry and Exit of Nursing Homes in Urban Areas, by Affiliation: United States, 1997-2000
size or urban influence status, expansion in
the LTC industry stopped after 1997.
During the 3 years from 1998 to 2000, 75
percent of all counties in the United States
had no net change—71 percent had no
entry or exit activity at all, and in 4 percent
of counties an equal number of SNF
providers opened as closed  (quite possibly
from changes of ownership).  Surprisingly,
for the remaining 25 percent of counties
that experienced some change in their sup-
ply of SNFs, increases were slightly more
common than decreases; nearly twice as
many counties had a net gain in freestand-
ing facilities as had a net loss, but the large
number of closures among hospital-based
facilities offset these.
There are pronounced regional differ-
ences in market activity after 1998 that
relate to the difference in mix of freestand-
ing versus hospital-based facilities, but may
also reflect differences in the State regula-
tory environment.  Most of the Nation’s
counties that lost facilities between 1998
and 2000 are in the Southwest, Mountain,
and Pacific coast areas (particularly Texas
and California), and most of the reductions
are in hospital-based units.  Sixty percent of
counties on the Pacific coast and nearly 40
percent of urban counties in the southwest-
ern States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma,
and Texas) lost SNFs.  Several major urban
counties in the New England area, howev-
er, also saw a reduction of facilities after
1998.  
We examined characteristics of the coun-
ties that experienced post-PPS contraction
in their number of SNFs, to determine if
they were significantly different from coun-
ties with expansion or with no net change,
with respect to  sociodemographics or under-
lying supply-related characteristics (Table
2).  Looking only at bivariate comparisons
of group means, counties that lost nursing




























NOTES: Rural identified according to 1997 Urban Influence Codes (Ghelfi, L.M. and Parker, T.S., 1997).
SOURCE: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Data analysis from the Online Survey and Certification
Reporting System File, 2001.
Figure 5
Entry and Exit of Nursing Homes in Rural Areas, by Affiliation: United States, 1997-2000









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































homes post-PPS tended to have a some-
what smaller share of elderly population
and a higher proportion of non-white resi-
dents, as compared both with counties that
gained facilities and with counties with no
change.  Counties with supply changes in
either direction during the post-PPS period
tended to be larger, and were more likely to
have already expanded their SNF supply in
the previous 3 years, than those with no
change.  These are counties where the mar-
ket is generally more active, which may be
a characteristic associated simply with pop-
ulation size.  There were no significant dif-
ferences between county groups in their
population-based LTC supply measures,
which we defined as the ratio of certified
LTC beds to residents age 65 and over.
A major limitation of these bivariate com-
parisons is that they fail to account for dif-
ferences in State regulatory environments.
Licensure and oversight vary widely in
their intensity, and State-run Medicaid
Programs vary in the generosity of their
payments and their LTC care eligibility cri-
teria.  Certificate of Need  laws heavily restrict
market entry in some States, have a mod-
est impact in others, and are non-existent
in still others.  States with less regulatory
interference may be more likely to see
activity of any kind (openings or closings)
than those with tougher laws.  Any assess-
ment of county-level differences in market
response to PPS needs to account in some
way for these State policy effects.
To identify the independent effects of
sociodemographic characteristics and sup-
ply variables on the post-PPS activity, we
constructed multivariate models for the
probability of a county’s experiencing a net
decline in SNFs between 1998 and 2000, in
which we controlled for fixed policy effects
using dummy variables by State location.
The model’s explanatory variables includ-
ed the characteristics listed in Table 2, plus
dichotomous variables set equal to one if
the county had experienced a net increase
in SNFs between 1995 and 1997.  After con-
trolling for county population and State
location, the strongest predictor for a coun-
ty-level reduction during the PPS transition
period is the indicator for having had an
expansion in facilities during the three pre-
PPS years.  Apart from the size of the coun-
ty population, none of the sociodemo-
graphic characteristics are significantly
associated with the likelihood of a post-PPS
reduction.  In contrast to the findings from
bivariate comparisons shown in Table 2,
the multivariate model indicates that coun-
ties with higher bed-to-population ratios in
1997 are also more likely to have experi-
enced SNF reductions.  Thus, post-PPS
losses in nursing homes at the county level
are associated with market/supply related
factors, but not with sociodemographics.
Because most of the post-PPS decline in
facilities happened in metropolitan areas,
we also tested to see if the marginal effect
of prior-period increases is different in
rural than in urban settings, but we found
no evidence of this.  (Regression results
are not included in this article, but they are
available on request from the author.)
All of our findings are similar in signifi-
cance and direction when we model coun-
ty-level losses of hospital-based units sepa-
rately from losses of freestanding units.
The separate models by facility type add
the interesting finding that the likelihood
of a post-PPS reduction in hospital-based
units is associated with recent expansion in
hospital-based units, but not with recent
expansion in freestanding units (and vice-
versa). This finding suggests that the two
types of providers may serve distinct mar-
kets, and lends support to the position that
hospital-based settings provide care for a
systematically different type of patient.
In Table 3 we summarize the effects of
the two main supply-related covariates
using probabilities simulated from the
28 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Winter 2002/Volume 24, Number 2






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































models. The probabilities in this table are
derived by holding values for the county-
level measures to their observed values,
for all variables other than the one being
simulated (effectively averaging the other
variables across the values contained with-
in the analytic sample).  Counties with an
increase in facilities immediately pre-PPS
were roughly twice as likely to have a post-
PPS decrease, than those that did not.  The
underlying sample proportions of a post-
PPS decrease differ by location and type of
facility, but the marginal effect of prior-
period expansion on the probability of a
post-PPS decrease is similar across groups.
Rural location was eliminated as an inde-
pendent variable in the models (since it is
captured indirectly though the county pop-
ulation); because of the substantial differ-
ences in the sample’s probability of the out-
come between rural and urban counties,
however, Table 3 summarizes simulated
probabilities separately for these two
groups.  For all three outcomes modeled,
the simulated effects of the bed-to-popula-
tion ratio are proportionally smaller than
those of prior-period expansion, but they
are still substantial.  A bed supply of 84 per
1,000 elderly residents (the 75th percentile
of the sample distribution) yielded proba-
bilities of a post-PPS reduction in facilities
that were one-third to one-half again as
large as the probabilities when the supply
was only 44 per 1,000 (the 25th percentile).
In theory, the association between post-
PPS facility reduction and prior-period
facility expansion could be an artifact of
negative autocorrelation.  This occurs where
activity in either direction in one time peri-
od tends to be followed by activity in the
opposite direction in the next period.  We
do not think this is a likely explanation, in
large part because of the small number of
counties where there was any net reduc-
tion to capacity in the years immediately
leading up to PPS.
DISCUSSION
The time series presented in this article
indicate that the introduction of Medicare
SNF PPS coincided with an abrupt halt in
the expansion of the skilled LTC markets.
Yet it is worth stressing that the payment
rules and rates are still evolving, and that
what is pictured here may be a short-term
industry response only.  
Although Medicare pays for fewer than 1
in 10 admissions, short-term or long-term
sensitivity of nursing homes to the Medicare
regulatory environment should not be sur-
prising, because Medicare post-acute ser-
vices have been the main source of expan-
sion in demand in nursing home care since
the 1980s. While SNF PPS was not neces-
sarily intended to reduce Medicare benefi-
ciaries’ skilled nursing admission rates,
one of its objectives was to reduce the use
of unnecessary care during SNF stays and,
by definition, this should have the effect of
lowering demand for some SNF services.
From these data we find that the industry
expansion was at least temporarily halted,
yet there has been no overall reduction in
the number of Medicare-participating facil-
ities during the transition period.  Any
change in price causes some market
adjustment and our data indicate that there
have been localized reductions in capacity.
Had these reductions occurred in particu-
larly poor, isolated, underserved or other-
wise vulnerable communities there would
be reason for concern, but we have found
no evidence of this.  Our findings may
reflect only a temporary response, but
there is nothing to indicate that wide-
spread reductions may begin after 2000 in
the absence of significant new rate-reduc-
ing regulation.
PPS based on all-inclusive rates per cov-
ered day does not provide any theoretical
incentive to reduce SNF admissions or
length of stay, and therefore should not
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necessarily affect demand as measured by
occupied beds.  It should, however, moti-
vate nursing homes to reduce costs by
reducing the intensity of services deliv-
ered per day.  It may (depending on the
accuracy of its case-mix adjusters) create
disincentives to admit the more medically
intensive patients.  This distinction is rele-
vant to our findings with respect to hospi-
tal-based settings, where the 1998
Medicare stays were one-half as long, but
50 percent more costly per day, than those
of freestanding facilities (Health Care
Financing Administration, 2001).  There
are several plausible explanations for the
differential decline in hospital-based units
after PPS.  Closing a single unit within an
organization should be less costly than
closing an entire facility.  As a result, the
decision to close might be undertaken
more readily in hospital settings, particu-
larly in urban areas where the SNF is less
likely to be part of the hospital’s core mis-
sion and clinical staff are more easily
absorbed into other units.  This would be
true even if there were no systematic dif-
ferences in operating cost structure or
average profitability between hospital-
based and freestanding settings.  A more
plausible, and not mutually exclusive,
explanation is that there are systematic dif-
ferences between the two settings in cost
and profitability.  If hospital-based units
have historically had higher per-diem
costs, they are likely to be facing lower pay-
ment margins under PPS, at least in the ini-
tial years.  The standardized per-day
amounts in the PPS rates were derived
from base year costs in a way that gave
lower weights to costs in hospital-based
than freestanding settings, and as a conse-
quence the rates may understate expected
costs allocated as a result of standard
Medicare cost accounting rules.  In addi-
tion, the RUG-based patient classification
system is not a very precise tool for acuity
measurement for skilled-level care (Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission, 1999).  If
hospital-based units serve a more complex
patient group whose severity is not cap-
tured by the RUG weights, this will have
the effect of reducing their PPS margins
relative to those in freestanding units, for
reasons not related to differences in effi-
ciency. 
Finally, the BBA also contained provi-
sions that required CMS to make it more
difficult for hospitals to improve their
acute-care profitability under the inpatient
PPS by shortening their lengths of stay
through earlier discharges to post-acute
care.  These were changes to the inpatient
hospital payment rules (rather the SNF
rules), which reduced payment for certain
diagnosis-related groups if the patient was
transferred to a SNF or acute rehabilitation
unit within a certain number of days after
admission.  Such changes may well have
altered the hospitals’ assessment of the
usefulness of operating a SNF unit. An
inability to fully recover either fixed costs
allocated to the SNF unit or the variable
costs associated with complex SNF patients,
occurring simultaneously with reduced
opportunities to use SNF care to improve
their acute care margins, could certainly
have caused hospitals to reconsider the role
of a SNF unit in their overall business plan.
The data on nursing home closures dur-
ing the initial post-PPS years points to a
possible problem in the rate structure for
urban hospital-based units.  To the extent
that former hospital-based patients can be
adequately cared for in existing freestand-
ing capacity (or by remaining in an acute-
care bed), the reduction of hospital-based
units is not necessarily a policy problem for
the Medicare Program.  If, however, there
continues to be a distinct group of more
severely disabled patients that are appro-
priate for SNF-level care, but are not ade-
quately covered by the new rates, then the
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW/Winter 2002/Volume 24, Number 2 31
reduction in hospital-based capacity mere-
ly transfers the profitability problems from
the hospital to the freestanding setting.
This could translate into reduced benefi-
ciary access or quality-of-care problems for
the more complex patients.  Pre- and post-
PPS patterns in unit costs, service intensi-
ty and profitability need to be examined at
the claims level in order to disentangle the
financial and policy issues of rate adequacy.
This task will be particularly important to
undertake over the next few years, as it
becomes possible to merge cost report,
individual claims, and clinical data, in order
to inform the continuing debate on PPS in
LTC. 
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